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ABSTRACT
The present study identified specific observable and measurable be­
haviors in Deer group interactions that contributed to cooperation among 
the group members. A determination as to whether groups of children who 
scored high on a moral judgment measure interacted more cooperatively than 
groups of children who scored low on the same measure was desired. It 
was expected that groups of children scoring high on a test of moral judg­
ment would exhibit more behaviors contributing to group cooperation than 
groups scoring low.
There were two parts to the study: initially, six specific behaviors 
found in peer group interactions that seemed to contribute to overall co­
operation among group members were isolated, and a system for scoring 
these behaviors as they occurred was devised. The basis for identification 
of these behaviors were Piaget's observations of children's social games. 
Secondly, five groups of children scoring high on a test of moral judgment 
and five groups scoring low were formed. The children interacted by per­
forming a group task— inventing a game from a collection of standard materi­
als. While they performed the task, raters scored their behavior for 
amount of cooperation. The data was analyzed in two ways. First, the five 
high and the five low moral judgment grouDS were compared on each of the 
six identified cooperative behaviors to determine if differences existed 
between the high and low groups on any one specific behavior. Then, the 
high and low moral judgment groups were compared in general on all of the
identified cooperative behaviors combined to determine whether overall dif­
ferences between the two types of groups existed.
The results suggested that moral judgment level related to amount of 
coooerativeness displayed in a peer group, especially when cooperativeness 
was measured by the number of group members who offered one or more opinions 
about the group task. High moral judgment groups consistently showed more 
cooperative behaviors than the low moral judgment groups although not all 
of the differences were statistically significant.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Many have attempted to investigate moral judgment in the child; how­
ever, the inspiration for such investigations in recent years has grown 
primarily out of the work of two men: Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg.
In 1932, Piaget's classic study, The Moral Judgment of the Child, provided 
a theoretical framework for psychological research, but perhaps more im­
portantly, it provided an assessment technique for moral judgment. An 
elaboration and extension of Piaget's work was undertaken by 'Kohlberg 
(1963, 1964, 1969).
Although their theories differ in many respects, both adhere to the 
perspective of a cognitive, developmental psychology in which "internal 
moral standards are . . . the outcome of a set of transformations of primi­
tive attitudes and conceptions. These transformations accompany cognitive 
growth in the child's perceptions and orderings of a social world with 
which he is continuously interacting" (Kohlberg, 1963). Their view is in 
contrast to those who see moralization as a process of internalizing cul­
turally given external rules through rewards, punishments, or identifica­
tion and to those who consider the source of moralization located entirely 
in innately determined structures. Kohlberg summarizes one distinction: 
"Without questioning the view that the end point of the moralization pro­
cess is one in which conduct is oriented to internal standards, one may 
well reject the assumption that such internal standards are formed simply 
through a process of 'stamping in' the external prohibitions of the culture
1
2upon the child's mind" (Kohlberg, 1963). Turiel (1969) remarks that from 
the developmental point of view, moral thought involves assimilating and 
integrating the external world to the structure of the organism--thought 
results from the organism's attempts to organize reality rather than from 
the unfolding of innate patterns or the internalization of environmental 
patterns.
Thus, the point of view represented by Piaget and Kohlberg's studies 
is an interactionist view. At any particular developmental phase, change 
is due to an interaction of the child's experience and his/her existing 
cognitive structures which have been acquired in the developmental process 
These structures influence how the environment is perceived, and, in turn, 
the interaction between the ever-changing structures and new experience 
leads to the reorganization of structures and thus, to development and 
change--a perpetual cycle of relationship between the biological-psycho­
logical organism and its osycho-social environment. The functioning stage 
of the child (in this case, his/her stage of moral thought) reflects his/ 
her underlying structures. In accordance with this view, Piaget and 
Kohlberg have tried to investigate the modes of thought underlying moral 
responses in order to focus on the structure as opposed to the content of 
the response. Implicit in their methodology, is the conviction that the 
organization of a child's thought is qualitatively different from that of 
an adult and a study of moral development must include an analysis of 
developmental changes.
The technique used to assess the changes in thought was first de­
veloped by Piaget and later extended by Kohlberg. It consists of present­
ing the child with stories which reflect various moral dilemmas and elicit 
ing from him or her a judgment as to the "rightness" or "wrongness" or
3"fairness" of a particular course of action and an explanation of why he 
or she made that particular judgment. Many dimensions of moral judgment 
are investigated using this basic technique, but Piaget and Kohlberg differ 
as to precisely what the dimensions are and how they are defined. They al­
so differ in their interpretation of how the various developmental stages 
are derived--that is, what environmental influences seem most salient in
producing change. In general, Kohlberg tends to be much more specific
#
than Piaget in his delineation of what constitutes a child's thought pro­
cess at each stage of development. Piaget, on the other hand, does not find 
a single, simple scheme of developmental stages. However, he does speak of 
a major underlying progression from one moral orientation to another. Kur- 
tines and Grief (1974) and Graham (1972) both note these differences between 
Piaget and Kohlberg.
Piaget recognizes two types of morality in the child which are due to 
formative processes that follow on one another, but do not constitute defin­
ite stages. In addition, an intermediate phase exists (Piaget, 1965, p. 195). 
The first type, the "morality of constraint" is characterized by a unilateral 
respect for adult rules, by duty and "heteronomv," that is, by a lack of 
moral freedom or self-determination. It is also characterized by a rigidity 
in thinking that does not allow the child to see beyond his or her own per­
spective. The second type, the "morality of cooperation" develops gradu­
ally out of social interactions with other children which foster mutual res­
pect and solidarity. It is characterized by "autonomy" (self-determination). 
In this phase, the child becomes increasingly aware of cooperation as the 
ideal form of social behavior and learns to take another's point of view 
(Piaget, 1965, p. 335). An intermediate phase can be identified during 
which rules and commands are interiorized and generalized (Piaget, 1965, p. 
195).
4Kohlberg delineates six developmental types of value-orientation 
which he divides into three levels. In level I, the basis of moral judg­
ment lies in external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad acts or in quasi­
physical needs rather than in persons and standards. Stage 1 is charac­
terized by an obedience and punishment orientation with egocentric deference 
to superior oower or prestige or a trouble avoiding set. Stage 2 is domi­
nated by a naive egoistic orientation in which right action is that which 
satisfies the self's needs and occasionally others'. At level II, moral 
value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conven­
tional order and the expectancies of others. Stage 3 involves a "good-boy 
orientation"--the dominant mode of thought is toward pleasing others and 
conforming to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior. 
During stage 4, there is a concern for maintaining social order for its own 
sake and for sharing respect for authority. The highest level of moral 
judgment (level III) has as its basis conformity by the self to shared or 
shareable standards, rights or duties. This level includes stage 5 in which 
duty is defined in terms of contract, and there is a general avoidance of 
violation of the will and rights of others. Stage 6 is the highest level 
of moral maturity and is characterized by an orientation to conscience as 
directing agent and to mutual respect and trust. Orientation is not only 
to actually ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving 
appeal to logical universality and consistency (Kohlberg, 1969).
From the above description of Piaget and Kohlberg's systems, it can 
be seen that they differ not only in the number of stages or moral reason­
ing and their specificy but also in regard to the end point of development. 
Piaget's moral maturity is attained when an individual is capable of 
autonomous reasoning (around the age of 12), but for Kohlberg, moral
5maturity is defined as the capacity for principled reasoning and is not 
reached by all people. Those who attain this level or moral reasoning do 
so in their late teens. Perhaps the primary reason for the discrepancy 
in the two theories is the fact'that Kohlberg studied older children than 
did Piaget— his samples included adolescents in their teenage years, where­
as Piaget concentrated his studies on children 12 and younger.
Another way in which Piaget and Kohl berg differ is in their interpre­
tation of how the various developmental stages are derived. Piaget places 
heavy emphasis on the imoortance of peer cooperation in the development of 
mature moral judgment— movement from an authoritarian to a democratic ethic. 
Although Kohlberg agrees that early moral judgment is oriented to obedience 
and impersonal forces and progresses to more internal and subjective values, 
he does not find the source of the shift in increased peer cooperation and 
decreased respect for adult authority. Kohlberg (1964) cites two studies 
which he claims indicate that Piaget overestimated the influence of peer co­
operation. The first is an investigation of Israeli children by Johnson 
(1962) in which he found that children raised in the Kibbutz (where peer in­
teraction is supposedly at a maximum) were at no higher level in making 
moral judgments than children raised in the traditional family. In another 
study cited by Kohlberg (MacRae, 1954), parental democracy (permissiveness) 
was not found to relate to moral development on the Piaget dimensions. Kohl- 
berg's argument is weakened by the fact that neither of these studies di­
rectly investigate the type or quality of peer interaction and how it relates 
to level of moral judgment. Moreover, Piaget does not indicate that a clear 
relationship between peer cooperation and moral maturity exists; he observes 
that respect for peers and peer group solidarity is increasing at the same 
time as moral judgment is shifting from a predominately heteronomous to a
more autonomous focus.
6In The Moral Judgment of the Child (1965), Piaget first presented his 
extensive observations of the social behavior of children among themselves 
as they engaged in the game of marbles. He showed that there is a gradual 
trend in the way children consciously perceive the rules of the game.
At first, there is no regard for rules as obligations. Then, unilateral 
respect for them as eternal and sacred laws emerges. Finally, rules are 
regarded as laws arising from mutual consent that can be changed if general 
opinion can be enlisted on one’s side. From his discussion and examples 
of the development of peer cooperation in the game of marbles, Piaget argued 
that the social life of children among themselves was sufficient to give 
rise to adult morality. The succeeding chapters of the book illustrate 
the changes in thought that occur with different dimensions of moral judg­
ment as the child progresses from a "heteronomous" to an "autonomous" 
orientation.
Piaget did not examine concurrently peer cooperation and type of 
moral judgment. An examination of this kind seems crucial to Piaget's con­
tention that peer group cooperation is an important factor in the develop­
ment of moral judgment. Investigations of Piaget's theories have tended 
to ignore this asoect of his thinking or have studied it in very indirect 
ways. Thus, the orimary focus of the present study was to examine the re­
lationship between the quality of peer group interaction and the level of 
moral judgment.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Piaget defined moral judgment as consisting of a number of different 
dimensions. One of these he called "moral realism" versus "moral rela­
tivism." Younger children tend to judge an act in terms of its physical 
consequences, disregarding the motives behind the act (moral realism); 
whereas, older children take into account the intent or motive behind an 
act when judging its "rightness" or "wrongness" (moral relativism). Another 
dimension was "immanent justic.e"--the belief (usually held by younger chil­
dren) that unfortunate occurrences or natural disasters (punishments) have 
supernatural causes and a rejection of chance or accidental punishments.
A third dimension involved "retributive" versus "restitutive" punishment. 
According to Piaget, older children tended to believe that punishment 
should merely restore the equilibrium destroyed by the punished act, while 
younger children clung to a belief in retribution. The dimension of the 
efficacy of severe punishment was also considered by Piaget. The more 
mature moral judges considered less severe punishment more effective. A 
final area of moral judgment investigated by Piaget was that of collective 
versus individual responsibility for punishable acts. Both very young 
and older children accept the idea of making a group responsible for acts 
committed by one or more individuals, while the middle age group reject 
the notion of collective responsibility.
Some of the research generated by Piaget's work concentrates on one 
or more of the various dimensions, but other studies scrutinize more
7
8general issues that have relevance for all the dimensions. One of the more 
global aspects of moral development involves the concept of "egocentrism." 
According to Piaget, the young child does not distinguish his own viewpoint 
from that of others: his thought is egocentric. In order for mature moral 
judgments to be made, the child must be able to shift his cognitive per­
spective to that of other peonle. Another way of understanding this change 
is that the child must learn to take the role or viewpoint of another.
There is evidence to indicate that the ability to take the perspective of 
another person is positively correlated with the ability to render mature 
moral judgments (Ambron and Irwin, 1975; Koenig, Sulzer, New!and and Stur­
geon, 1973; Lerner, 1937b; Selman, 1971; Stuart, 1967)
Another general issue concerning Piaget's work is the question of the 
universality of his theory. Although Piaget tended to ignore individual 
differences due to sex, social class or culture, he did not discount them. 
Some investigators have attempted cross-cultural studies and have found 
differences in the ages at which certain types of moral judgments were made 
or differences in the rate of progression through either Kohlberg's or 
Piaget's stages (Graham, 1972; Simpson, 1974). However, no thorough 
studies of moral judgment in cultures other than the western European or 
American have been done, and Simpson (1974) seems justified in her state­
ment that assumptions often made in moral development research are ethno­
centric and culturally-biased.
More conclusive evidence can be found for social class differences.
In general, lower class children progress more slowly toward making mature 
moral judgments than middle or upper class children (Bloom, 1959; Harrower, 
1934; Lerner, 1937a). However, Boehm (1966) cautions against drawing 
the conclusion that lower class children always progress more slowly
9as he found that, on some measures of moral judgment, lower class children 
score about the same or higher than upper-middle class children of the 
same age.
Piaget's observation that children's thought about moral dilemmas 
gradually progresses from less mature to more mature phases has also in­
spired considerable research centering around the problem of how to "speed 
up" the developmental process. Many investigators, using a variety of 
methods, have attempted to train children to make more mature moral judg­
ments than they spontaneously do at a particular time. Most of these 
attempts have been successful, at least for a short period of time after 
the experiment (Armsby, 1971; Bandura and McDonald, 1963; Chandler, Green­
span and Barenboim, 1973; Cowan, Langer, Heavenrich and Nathanson, 1969; 
Crane and Ballif, 1973; Crowley, 1968; Glassco, Milgram and Youniss, 1970; 
Gutkin, 1972; Jensen and Hafen, 1973; McManis, 1974; Schleifer and Douglas, 
1973; Tracy and Cross, 1973; Turiel, 1966). These experimenters have tended 
to show that children can reach the phase of moral maturity at earlier ages 
than those suggested by Piaget because of certain training methods (e.g., 
modeling) or because the method of presenting moral dilemmas to the child 
was altered so that the younger child would be better able to attend to 
relevant stimuli for making mature judgments (e.g., videotapes, altered 
stories).
However, these investigations do not seem very relevant to Piaget's 
theory because they do not examine issues that are crucial to his theory. 
Piaget was not particularly concerned about the exact ages at which children 
reach moral maturity or about tamoering with the developmental process by 
training. More important to his conceptual framework was the question of 
what forces interacted to produce developmental changes in moral judgment.
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According to Piaget (1965), adult constraint, peer group cooperation 
and the changing character of the child's mind are the primary factors that 
interact to produce qualitative changes in the child's moral judgments. 
Piaget, himself, presented ample evidence to support the importance of the 
last of these factors (the changing character of the child's mind). In 
his work on moral judgment (1965), he did not hesitate to mention the 
parallelism that exists between moral and intellectual development and his 
conviction that development of moral thought is not separate from develop­
ment of thought in general. Thus, most of his comprehensive works on child 
logic and thought can be seen as evidence for the importance of one of 
the three factors (Piaget, 1926a, 1926b, 1929, 1950, 1952, 1954, 1958, 1962, 
1964).
On the other hand, Piaget offered very little direct evidence for 
the influence of the other two factors--adult constraint and peer coopera- 
tion--although he acknowledged their great importance. He merely argued 
for the existence of an "adult constraint" without attempting to observe 
or assess it as he did child thought. With peer cooperation, he did more 
than argue. As mentioned previously Piaget, recounted extensive inves­
tigations of spontaneous peer group interactions in the game of marbles.
He then related his observations of these interactions to his observa­
tions of children's judgments about moral dilemmas (Piaget, 1965). How­
ever, he did not concurrently make these two sets of observations on the 
same children, thereby weakening his argument that the two interact to 
produce change in moral judgment. Nor did he concurrently make observa­
tions of adult constraint with observations of peer relationships or moral 
dilemma judgments to support his argument that there are actually three 
forces which interact to produce developmental change in thought.
11
Johnson (1962) summarizes the problem well with the remark that 
Piaget does not seem to have achieved his second objective: showing how 
the interaction of constraint, cooperation and mental change cause develop­
mental change in moral judgment to occur. That Piaget achieved his primary 
objective--showing that developmental changes occur in moral judgment-- 
cannot be disputed. However, relatively few investigators have addressed 
themselves to the issue of Piaget's second objective. Most have been 
content with examining Piaget's "stages" of moral development and with 
perfecting assessment techniques for these "stages."
Besides the peoole, mentioned previously, who have tackled the more 
general issues emanating from Piaget's work (egocentrism, universality of 
the theory, "speeding up" development), there are those who have chosen to 
concentrate on clarifying one or more specific dimensions of moral judg­
ment suggested by Piaget and those who have tried to verify Piaget's results 
by employing his techniques on their own samples of children. Those in the 
later category have not always been able to closely duplicate Piaget's re­
sults (Durkin, 1959a; Medinnus, 1959). Consequently, they have generated 
research which focuses on clarifying some of the moral judgment areas and 
extending Piaget's original conceptions about what each area involved.
Moral judgment dimensions that have been investigated in this way include: 
moral realism versus moral relativism (Breznitz and Kugelmass, 1967; Hebble, 
1971; King, 1971; McKechnie, 1971; Morrison, 1973) and retributive 
versus restitutive punishment (Durkin, 1959b, 1961). These studies 
inspired by Piaget's original writings do not, however, grapple with the 
question that Piaget never satisfactorily answered: how do adult con­
straint, peer cooperation and the changing character of the child's mind 
interact to produce qualitative changes in the child's moral judgments?
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It has already been established that the changing character of the 
child's mind is an important factor in develoomental changes in moral 
judgment. Piaget's major works attest to that contention. But, Piaget 
himself and many others who criticize him also believe there are additional 
important factors accounting for this change. Some of those who criti­
cize Piaget for not regarding social and affective aspects of thinking 
(Bloom, 1959; Likona, 1969) are partially justified because he tended to 
ignore these factors in favor of his primary interest in cognitive pro­
cesses (Graham, 1972).
Adult constraint as a factor concomitant with changes in moral 
judgment has been a focus in a few studies. After replicating Piaget's 
studies on lower and upper class children, Harrower (1934) concluded 
that adult influence played a far greater part in the development of a 
sense of justice than Piaget would allow. Harrower believed that the dif­
ference in intellectual atmosphere was of utmost importance and that 
Piaget's emphasis on peer cooperation was too strong. A problem with his 
conclusion is that he did not consider that the quality of adult influ­
ence can affect how children cooperate with peers. Similar ideas about 
adult constraint were expressed by MacRae in interpreting Lerner's find­
ings (1937a) that higher status children gave more mature answers to 
Piaget-type questions than did lower status children with age and intelli­
gence controlled. MacRae (1954) explained that the difference could be 
due to the greater degree of parental authority which Lerner observed in 
lower status families. It is consonant with Piaget's theory that more 
adult constraint would tend to impede moral development, although,
13
eventually, the "morality of coooeration," gleaned from the mutual res­
pect and solidarity of the peer group, should supercede the influences of 
adults (Piaget, 1965, p. 198).
A more recent study claims to support the contention that adult con­
straint impedes moral development on at least one dimension (retributive 
versus restitutive punishment). Kuranuki (1968) reported that children, 
between the ages of 4 to 8 years, who lived in a democratic home atmosphere, 
tended to select restitutive punishment and those who lived in an auto­
cratic home atmosphere more often selected retributive punishment. The 
problem with this study is that both Piaget (1965) and Durkin (1959b,
1961) have found that 8 or 9 years is the transitional age at which chil­
dren begin to believe more strongly in punishment by restitution. It is 
somewhat questionable, in light of their results, what meaning Kuranuki's 
study has because he does not use subjects older than 8.
Johnson (1962) reported that parent attitudes were significantly re­
lated to moral judgments, particularly in the areas of immanent justice 
and collective versus individual responsibility, thus providing further 
support that adult constraint is a significant factor. In contrast to 
the above findings, Carlson (1973) finds little support for the importance 
of either adult constraint or peer interaction in the development of the 
idea of justice or moral realism (that is, in the dimensions of restitutive 
versus retributive punishment and moral realism versus moral relativism) in 
a study of Lao children.
Studies of the concurrent development of peer group cooperation and 
moral judgment are even more scarce than studies of adult constraint 
despite Piaget's emphasis on this as a major factor in the development of
14
higher phases of moral judgment. Edwards (1974) examined some of the influ­
ences upon the acquisition of moral concepts, in children ages 7 to 15 
by the use of self report measures. He found that children did not report 
peer influence as being important; mother's influence seemed to be the 
major influence and older children claimed they decided for themselves.
The later claim is support for Piaget's idea of movement towards "autonomy" 
in making moral judgments, however, Edwards did not mention this. Instead, 
he questioned Piaget's emphasis on "solidarity between equals" because 
children in his sample often named the influence of mother and rarely the 
influence of friends as being most helpful in making moral decisions 
about "rightness" or "wrongness." Furthermore, it is doubtful that Ed­
ward's method of directly questioning children as to "whom would they turn 
to for help if they were not sure whether something was 'right' or 'wrong': 
themselves, friends, mother, father, relatives, teachers or any other per­
son" is comparable to Piaget's more indirect interview technique in which 
he tried to elicit spontaneous comments from a child and did not directly 
suggest various influences.
A study which attempted to specify the relationships of peer influ­
ence to immediate and long-term modifications of adolescents' moral 
judgments was done by LeFurgy and Woloshin (1969). Kohlberg stories were 
used in an Asch-style social influence design in which both morally real­
istic and morally relativistic subjects were exposed to five confederates' 
responses which differed from their moral orientation (realistic or 
relativistic). Children of both sexes and moral orientations were found 
to yield to peer influence in their responses to the moral dilemmas.
Morally realistic subjects showed both immediate and long-term shifts in 
their judgment styles. However, morally relativistic subjects, while
15
evidencing short-term responsiveness to social influence showed a signifi­
cant diminution of these effects over the 100 days of the experiment.
These results were consistent with the work of other investigators 
(Turiel, 1966) who found children consistently more susceptible to ef­
forts designed to induce progressive rather than retrogressive change. 
LeFurgy and Woloshin interpret their results in a manner which seems con­
sonant with Piaget and developmental theory--"While such social influ­
ence may serve to modify immediate and short-term performance, the sali­
ence of induced conformity for social learning may depend upon its 
relevance to the developmental status of the subjects."
While the two above-mentioned experiments focused on the effects of 
peer interaction on moral judgment, neither attempted to examine 
directly the relationship between characteristics of spontaneous peer 
group interaction and types of moral judgments. Piaget seemed to think 
that peer group cooperation or solidarity was an essential force which 
helped to push the young child bound by adult constraint from a "hetero- 
nomous" to an "autonomous" moral orientation. According to him, the 
change was gradual and also dependent on cognitive development; however, 
he believed that "the social life of children amongst themselves is suf­
ficiently developed to give rise to a discipline infinitely nearer to that 
inner submission which is the mark of adult morality" (1965, p. 404). 
Piaget best summarized his views on this issue when he spoke about the 
development of the idea of justice:
The conclusion which we shall finally reach is that the sense of 
justice, though naturally capable of being reinforced by the pre­
cepts and the practical example of the adult, is largely inde­
pendent of these influences, and requires nothing more for its 
development than the mutual respect and solidarity which holds 
among children themselves. It is often at the expense of the
16
adult and not because of him that the notions of just and unjust 
find their way into the youthful mind. In contrast to a given 
rule, which from the first has been imposed upon the child from 
outside and which for many years he has failed to understand, 
such as the rule of not telling lies, the rule of justice is 
a sort of immanent condition of social relationships or a law 
governing their equilibrium. And as the solidarity between 
children grows we shall find this notion of justice gradually 
emerging in almost complete autonomy. (1965, p. 198)
From a look at unsubstantiated portions of Piaget's theory and a re­
view of the literature, arose a need for investigation of behaviors of 
children in social groups which foster cooperation and for clarification 
of how peer group cooperation and moral judgment are related. One focus 
of the present study was to identify specific behaviors in peer group 
interactions that contribute to cooperation among group members. In ad­
dition, a system for classifying groups according to the degree of mutual 
respect or cooperativeness existing in the group relationships was devised. 
A second main focus was to determine whether groups of children who 
scored high on a moral judgment measure interacted more cooperatively than 
groups of children who scored low on the same measure.
It was expected that specific behaviors could be identified that 
differentiated cooperative from less cooperative groups. Furthermore, it 
was anticipated that groups of children scoring high on a test of moral 
judgment would exhibit more of these behaviors contributing to group co­
operation than groups scoring low.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Overview
There were two parts to the study: initially, specific behaviors 
found in peer group interactions that seemed to contribute to overall 
cooperation among group members were isolated and a system for scoring 
these behaviors as they occurred was devised. Then, groups of children 
scoring high on a test of moral judgment and groups scoring low were 
formed. The children interacted by performing a group task-investing 
a game from a collection of standard materials. While they executed the 
task, raters scored their behavior for amount of cooperation.
Measuring devices
Cooperative behavior measures. Prior to conducting the experimental 
portion of the study, specific behaviors found in peer group interactions 
that seemed to foster cooperation were identified. The basis for identi­
fication of these behaviors was Piaget's extensive observations of chil­
dren's social games recorded in The Moral Judgment of the Child (1965), 
specifically the first section of that work dealing with how children make 
up the rules to games. Piaget characterized a "cooperative" group as 
one in which: 1. Everyone's opinion is heard. 2. Every member tries to 
make his/her ooinion dominant. 3. Rules can be altered if aeneral ooinion 
is elicited on one's side. 4. Rules are made bv general (group) consent
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rather than by appeal to adult "authority." 5. Rule systems are highly 
complex and detailed.
From Piaget's description, measures were developed by the author 
to indicate the degree of "cooperativeness" existing in peer group.
Six measures were identified and used in the present experiment. They 
were:
1. Percentage of group members who offered one or more opinions. 
This is based on Piaget's notion that in a group characterized by coopera­
tion, every individual proposition is worthy of attention. Thus, the 
greatest amount of cooperativeness would exist when all members felt the 
freedom and an obligation to offer an opinion.
2. The number of appeals the group members made to "authority." 
Piaget sees the child's cognitions as moving from a period of "heteronomy" 
or respect for adult authority to "autonomy" or reliance on the self.
It is during the later stage that children become capable of engaging in 
democratic group processes where rules are made by group consent and com­
promise rather than by appeal to maxims of adults or older children.
The fewer appeals made to an "authority," the more cooperative the group 
is judged to be.
3. Proportion of time each individual talked. In a highly coopera­
tive group, the climate is such that everyone would try to make their 
opinion dominant and the guilding rule for interaction supposedly is that 
rules can be altered if general opinion is elicited on one's side. These 
characteristics would result in near equal times of talking for all 
group members in a very cooperative group.
4. The number of different opinions made by the group members com­
bined. The greater the number of opinions verbalized, the more the group
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fosters mutual agreement and participation by all, thus, the more coopera­
tive the group.
5. The number of rules the group made for the game they invented. 
According to Piaget, cognitive development underlies and also parallels 
moral judgment development and cooperative behavior. Children in the more 
mature stages of cognitive thinking can abstract and anticipate problems 
and consequences and can engage in hypothesis testing. Thus, in making
up rules to a game, every detail is considered and the rules are codified 
to cover every possible alternative. The more cooperative group would be 
able to invent more rules because (a) the abstract thinking ability of 
its members should be better (they can think of more alternatives and 
rules to cover these) and (b) the spirit of cooperation and mutual respect 
would favor putting some part of everyone's opinions in the rules.
6. A subjective evaluation by the raters as to the degree of co­
operation they felt existed in the group. This measure was included as
a general indicator of which groups appeared to cooperate. Raters scored 
the groups on a 0 to 10 scale. The criteria for their rating was not 
specified. They were instructed to rate the group on the basis of their 
opinion of how cooperative it seemed to them.
Moral Judgment Test. A test of moral judgment was desired that would 
indicate functioning in children of 12-14 years. At these ages, coopera­
tive behaviors have been developing for several years and have become 
stable enough to be meaningfully measured. Piaget's stories that he used 
for assessment of moral reasoning were appropriate for children from 6 to 
12 years. Johnson (1962) had developed a moral judgment test to be used 
with older children (adolescents) which was based on Piaget's tests.
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Johnson devised a paper and pencil test consisting of 20 stories incorpora­
ting the five dimensions of moral judgment distinguished by Piaget.
Stories were constructed to be of approximately equal difficulty (in level 
of abstraction) and to be intrinsically interesting to the subjects.
Most stories were similar in meaning to those of Piaget. Even though the 
subjects were older than those of Piaget, increasing the difficulty of 
the stories led to considerable variation in responses. Total test re­
liability for Johnson's Moral Judgment Test ranged from .55 to .61 depend­
ing on grade level (grades 5, 7, 9, 11 were used). Thus, this test of 
moral judgment seemed an appropriate one for use in the present study as 
no other recent revisions of Piaget's stories could be found. (See Appen­
dix A for the Moral Judgment Test)
Subjects
This study included students in the eighth grade at a parochial 
school in a medium-sized northern Minnesota town (population 7,600) and 
students in eighth grade confirmation classes of a church in the same 
town. Seventy-seven children were given the Moral Judgment Test. Of 
these 49 were girls and 28 were boys. Forty of the children who took the 
Moral Judgment Test also participated in the group interaction part of 
the study--24 females and 16 males. Both parts of the study (The Moral 
Judgment Test and the group interaction portion) were conducted in the 
school or church where the classes met.
Procedure
Permission. Parental permission was first obtained from parents of 
all children who would be participating in one or both parts of the study.
21
A letter was sent home with the students which explained the research and 
a consent form had to be signed by one parent in order for the child 
to participate (Appendix B).
Initial testing. The author gave the Moral Judgment Test to the 
entire class of participating students at once (four classes were involved, 
so it was given four times). The stories were read to the students as 
they followed along and they were given a chance to write their responses. 
Administration took 35-45 minutes depending on the class. The specific 
instructions were as follows:
This is a sort of test, but it is not a test in the same way that 
you might be tested in arithmetic, because, as far as I know, 
there are no right or wrong answers. No one from the school here 
will know what you wrote down. The reason that I am asking these 
questions is this: I am interested in what young people think, 
because if we know more about what you think, we might be able 
to understand each other better. There are no right or wrong 
answers to these questions, so I'd just like you to put down 
what you think or really feel. I'll read each question while 
you follow along on your copy of the questions. Then you put 
down your answer. When you are ready I'll read the next ques­
tion and we'll go on that way. Don't look at your neighbor's 
paper; just put down what you think. Be sure and answer every 
question. Are there any questions? (If so, they were answered.)
O.K., let's begin. (Johnson, 1952)
After the students took the Moral Judgment Test, they were informed 
that some of them would be asked to participate in another study. They 
were told that selection for the other study would be random and that they 
would participate in the other study in groups of four. The experimenter 
(author) never indicated to the subjects that a relationship existed be­
tween the two parts of the study. The only apparent relationship was the 
presence of the author on both occasions. The subjects were never for­
mally debriefed about this aspect of the study. However, school personnel 
and teachers were informed of the relationship between the two parts of 
the study in a written summary of the results which was given to them.
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Parents and students were told before participating that they could ob­
tain a copy of the results from the principal or classroom teacher.
Groups,. Based on scores obtained on the Moral Judgment Test (see 
Appendix A for scoring procedures), students were divided into two groups-- 
low scorers and high scorers. The range of scores on the test was 5-17—
(JM = 12.1, SD = 2.48). The lowest and the highest scorers were desired 
for the second part of the study, so the 20 lowest and the 20 highest 
scorers were asked to participate in another study. They were not told 
that their performance on the test they had taken previously determined in 
which group they would be. As mentioned previously, they were led to be­
lieve that selection for the second part of the study was random.
Five groups of low scorers and five groups of high scorers (each 
group had four members) were formed. In the final groupings, the mean 
moral judgment score for each group of high scorers was 15. The means for 
the groups of low scorers were 9, 9, 9, 10, and 8. Subjects interacted 
in groups only with other subjects from the same church or school. The 
composition of the groups according to sex was as follows: all five of 
the high moral judgment groups were composed of three females and one 
male; of the low moral judgment groups, three were composed of two males 
and two females, one of three females and one male and one of four males.
Children who were at the same grade level (8th grade) were used so 
that they would have had some contact with each other and would not be 
strangers, and, also, so they would be at approximately the same level 
intellectually and socially. For the purposes of the study, the most 
"natural" play groups of children possible without using actual "cliques" 
of close friends were desired. The teachers checked as to whether or 
not the groups contained very close friends prior to the group interaction
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phase of the study. A few changes were made based on the teacher's infor­
mation about cliques. Also, a few substitutions were made the day of 
the group interaction phase as several students were absent from class.
Group interaction. This part of the study was done two or three 
weeks after administration of the Moral Judgment Test. Both high and low 
moral judgment groups were led into a large, vacant classroom by the 
author. Subjects were asked to be seated around a table on which was 
placed (in a standardized arrangement) the following objects: 1 game 
board made from 28" x 22" poster board with places for the index cards (be­
low), 4 paper cups, 40 flags made from red, white and blue crepe paper 
and straws, 1 package of glued stars, 30 index cards with names of famous 
historical persons or events on one side and descriptions of the person 
or event on the other. All the cards contained a person or event connected 
with the American Revolution and were divided into four piles: People, 
Events, Reforms, and Quotations. Other materials included 1 pair of dice,
4 felt pens and 1 stack of blank paper.
The following instructions were read to the subjects by the author:
See these objects? I would like you to use them to make up a 
game. You can invent any kind of game you like as long as you 
use these materials. Try to be creative and make it a "fun" 
game.
Here are pens and a piece of paper. I want you to write down 
the rules to your new game on this paper. Use as many sheets 
of paper as you need.
This is a kind of contest. Some judges will decide how good 
the game you made is by the rules that you write down. The 
judges will pick the game that they think is the best and a 
prize of $10 will be given to the group that invented the best 
game.
There are two things that you cannot do. One is you can't des­
troy any of the materials or bend them in any way. The other 
is that you can't write or mark on anything but this paper.
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Now, do you understand? You invent a game to play with these things 
and write the rules down on this paper. I will be interested in 
getting these rules so the judges can see how good your game is, 
so remember to write them down. Any questions? (If so, they were 
answered.)
These are two college students (referring to the raters). They will 
be sitting here waiting until you finish and then they will pick 
up the materials and your rules and get the things ready for the 
next group of kids. O.K., if you have no more questions, you can 
begin. You will have 15 minutes.
The author then left the room and returned after 15 minutes had elapsed.
Raters. The raters were two undergraduate students who were assist­
ing the author with the present study in order to meet research requirements 
for their psychology courses. Neither rater knew until after the data was 
collected that the study involved moral judgment nor that the groups in­
volved high and low scorers. They were told only that this was a Piagetian- 
type study and that "cognitive" measures had been given previous to the 
group interaction portion of the study in which they participated. Both 
were trained by the author during a pilot study to record the cooperative 
behaviors outlined above. They practiced making ratings on pilot groups 
until the task became easy for them.
During the time the group interacted, the raters sat in the room 
with them and each kept records of the behaviors of two different chil­
dren. They recorded the number of different opinions made, the number of 
appeals to authority and the number of seconds each child talked (using 
a stopwatch). The raters also served as "the authority" to whom the sub­
jects could appeal for help. When appeals were made, the raters were in­
structed to answer with something like "You can do it anyway you like" 
but not to repeat any specific instructions. Sometimes they had to say,
"You heard the instructions and didn't have any questions about them
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then. . . . "  They were to give no suggestions, feedback, or direct assis­
tance and to generally ignore requests for help after their initial 
response. Some groups asked several questions of the raters, but they 
were all very brief encounters and in general, the children ignored the 
raters immediately after each request was answered in the above suggested 
manner.
Inter-rater agreement. An attempt was made to determine how much 
the two raters agreed in scoring cooperative behaviors by computing per­
centage agreement scores for three of the six measures. To determine 
agreement for measures 1, 2 and 4, the raters recorded the behaviors of 
the same two subjects in one of the pilot sessions prior to conducting the 
present study. The session was divided into 20, one-minute segments and 
the percentage of the 40 segments (20 segments for each rated subject) 
in which the raters recorded the same number of a particular behavior was 
calculated. The percentage agreement score for measure 1 (group members 
who offered one or more opinions) was 100 percent, for measure 2 (number 
of appeals to authority), 100 percent, for measure 4 (number of different 
opinions made), 72 percent.
For measure 3 (total time each individual talked), the difference 
between the two raters' recordings of seconds each person talked was 5 
seconds for one subject who talked a total of 96 seconds and 13 seconds 
for one who talked 155 total seconds.
For measure 5 (the number of rules the group made for the game they 
invented), the two raters devised a system to count the number of rules.
Two other individuals also devised a system independently. For the ten 
groups, the independent couples differed on only two groups--the difference
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being that one pair of counters included the existence of a title for the 
game as a rule and the other pair did not.
For measure 6 (subjective evaluation by the raters as to the degree 
of cooperativeness), no interrater agreement, was assessed. The two raters 
decided between themselves which rating (0-10) to assign immediately after 
each group had finished the task.
The scoring of the Moral Judgment Test was also checked for inter­
scorer agreement. The author scored all of the items on all the tests 
herself and formed groups on the basis of her scorings. To check on the 
reliability of the scoring, a student of education who knew no details 
about the study but who was somewhat familiar with Piaget's theory of 
moral reasoning was asked to score the items on 10 randomly selected Moral 
Judgment Test (200 total items) protocols which had previously been scored 
by the author using the scoring criteria outlined in Appendix A. The 
percentage agreement score between the author's scoring of the Moral 
Judgment Test and the other person's scoring was 96 percent.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The data was analyzed in two different ways. First, the five high 
and the five low moral judgment groups were compared on each of the six 
cooperativeness measures to determine if differences existed between the 
two groups on any of the individual measures. Secondly, the high and 
low moral judgment groups were compared in general on all of the coopera­
tiveness measures combined to determine whether overall differences be­
tween the two groups were present. This combination of individual analy­
ses and multivariate analyses allowed for maximum use of the data and 
contributed both specific information about each measure and a global 
overview of cooperativeness in the high and low groups.
Analysis of individual measures
Measure 1: Percentage of group members who offered one or more 
opinions. A i>test was performed to determine whether there was a sig­
nificantly reater percentage of group members in the high moral judgment 
gfoups who 'offered opinions about how to construct the game. Results 
of this test are shown in Table 1 which contains the ten group scores for 
each of the six cooperativeness measures, the statistic used to analyze 
the scores, and the value of the statistic. A statistically significant 
difference (£ < .01) between high and low moral judgment groups was found 
on measure 1. This suggests that groups whose members scored high on a 
test of moral judgment contained a greater number of individuals who
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TABLE 1
HIGH AND LOW MORAL JUDGMENT GROUP SCORES FOR 
SIX COOPERATIVENESS MEASURES
Measure High Groups Low Groups Statistic Value
1. Percentage Giving 
Opinions 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 100 25 100 t 5.49*
2. Number of Appeals 
to Authority 0 3 3 1 0 3 7 4 2 0 5 1.343
3. Variance in 
Individuals' 
Talk Time 11.88 28.4 33.46 33.18 41.69 58.36 15.58 41.4 5.8 5.94 C
C
.28
.46
4. Number of 
Opinions 25 21 45 24 40 22 13 39 1 15 t 1.67
5. Number of rules 7 4 7 9 9 9 6 0 0 5 t .739
6. Cooperativeness 
Ratings 8 4 8 6 6 5 5 6 1 7 U 7
*
p <.01 for 8 degrees of freedom
rv> co •
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offered opinions as to how to invent the game than groups whose members 
scored low.
Measure 2: Number of appeals to authority. A t-test was used to 
determine if there were a significantly greater number of appeals to adult 
authority from the low moral judgment groups than from the high groups. 
Statistical significance was not obtained in the analysis of this measure. 
However, the low groups combined did make more than twice as many appeals 
to adult authority as the high groups (high = 7 appeals, low = 16).
Measure 3: Variance in individuals' talk time. To analyze this 
measure, Cochran's test for the equality of population variances was used 
in order to determine whether the variances within both the high and the 
low moral judgment groupings were equal. Cochran's £ was computed for 
the high groups (£ = .28) and the low groups (£ = .46). Neither £ reached 
the significance level that was required to reject the hypothesis of equal 
variances. However, the £ for the low groups comes much closer to reject­
ing this hypothesis than the £ for the high groups.
Looking at the variance estimates in Table 1, the highest and the 
lowest variances in individuals' talking time are found in the low group 
columns. The variances in the high group columns are all moderately 
high and much more consistent with each other than the variance estimates 
of the low groups. This suggests that the interpersonal behavior (as 
measured by the proportion of time each individual talked in relation to 
the total time all individuals talked) of children scoring high on a test 
of moral judgment may be more stable, consistent and established than the 
interpersonal group behavior of children scoring low.
Measure 4: Number of opinions offered. A t-test was performed to 
determine whether individuals in high moral judgment groups offered a
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significantly greater number of opinions about how to construct the game 
than individuals in low moral judgment groups. Statistical significance 
was not obtained in the analysis of this measure. Nevertheless, high 
groups combined offered many more opinions than did low groups combined 
(high = 155 opinions, low = 90).
Measure 5: Number of game rules invented. For this measure, a t- 
test was performed to determine if high moral judgment groups invented 
more rules than low moral judgment groups. No statistically significant 
difference was obtained. The high groups combined did produce more rules, 
although the difference is slight (high = 36 rules, low = 29; average 
number of rules for high groups = 7.2, for low = 5.8).
Measure 6: Cooperativeness ratings. For the measure representing 
a subjective evaluation by the raters as to the degree of cooperation they 
felt existed in the group, a Mann-Whitney £ test was performed to deter­
mine whether high moral judgment groups were rated as more cooperative 
than low groups. No statistically significant difference between the two 
groups was found. However, high groups were usually rated as more coopera­
tive (mean rating for high groups = 6.4, for low groups = 4.8).
Analysis of cooperativeness measures combined
In the analysis of overall differences between high and low moral
judgment groups on all six cooperativeness measures combined, Hotelling's
was computed. Statistically significant differences between high and
low groups in general were not found (T^  = 12.836, £  = .802, df = 6.3,
p ^.01). There is a problem with this test which may account for the lack
2
of significant results. Hotelling's T requires more groups than measures-- 
this stipulation was met, but ideally even more groups should have been
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used. Thus, Hotelling's l} was not the ideal statistic for the present 
data. However, a more appropriate way of analyzing overall differences 
between high and low groups could not be found. The basic design of the 
study did not lend itself easily to most statistical procedures which 
could potentially provide more extensive information.
Summary of results
High moral judgment groups (as predicted) exhibited a significantly 
greater amount of cooperativeness as measured by how many members offered 
an opinion relating to the group task. Although the differences were 
not statistically significant, high moral judgment groups (as hypothesized) 
exhibited more cooperativeness as measured by the number of appeals to an 
authority, the number of different opinions offered, the ratings of co­
operativeness and to a lesser extent the number of rules invented and 
the variance in individuals' talk time. Thus, one of the six cooperative­
ness measures yielded significant differences between high and low groups 
in the predicted direction and the other five yielded nonsignificant dif­
ferences in the predicted direction. The analysis of all six measures 
combined did not indicate that high moral judgment groups interact more 
cooperatively than low groups, but the statistic used was not entirely 
appropriate for the data.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
One focus of the present study was to determine whether high moral 
judgment scorers would interact more cooperatively than low scorers.
The results suggest that moral judgment level does relate to amount of 
cooperativeness displayed in a peer group, especially when cooperative­
ness is measured by the number of group members who offer one or more 
opinions about the group task. Although high moral judgment groups inter­
acted significantly more cooperatively on only one measure, they consistently 
showed more cooperative behaviors than the low moral judgment groups on 
the other five measures as well. The other focus of the study was the 
identification of specific behaviors that contribute to group cooperation 
and the assessment of aroup cooperativeness on the basis of these be­
haviors. In relation to this purpose, the results indicate that groups 
can be differentiated on the basis of the cooperative behaviors that were 
identified and that the amount of cooperative behavior exhibited seems 
to relate to the level of moral judgment of the group participants.
Certain methodological considerations have contributed to the lack 
of statistical significance of the five measures which showed high moral 
judgment groups to be interacting more cooperatively than low groups, 
but not significantly so. First, the number of groups used in the present 
study was relatively small, allowing for consistency in ratings which could 
be made by the same raters over a short period of time, but not permitting 
the variance that a greater number of groups could provide and that could 
contribute to more informative results.
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Another consideration was the nature of the high versus low moral 
judgment group split. Even though the initial Moral Judgment Test was 
administered to twice as many subjects as was desired for the group 
interaction portion of the study, the numerical split between high and 
low scores of subjects actually used in the groups was not as great as 
one might desire for maximum differentiation. Many subjects had to be 
included in the groups whose moral judgment scores fell more in the inter­
mediate range of possible scores than in the high or low ranges. If the 
Moral Judgment Test had been given to a greater number of children 
initially (perhaps three or four times as many as needed in the groups), 
the high groups and the low groups could have included members who 
scored only at the extreme ends of the continuum of scores. More differ­
entiated groups on the basis of moral judgment scores may have exhibited 
more striking (and statistically significant) differences in cooperative 
behavior.
Implications for Piaget's theory
The investigation here described offers many implications for 
Piagetian theory. Of primary importance is the fact that evidence has 
been provided for a portion of Piaget's theory of moral reasoning that 
no one else has reported investigating. Piaget thought that moral judg­
ment and peer group cooperation were related and that probably each in­
fluenced the other within the sphere of cognitive and intellectual de­
velopment. Unfortunately, Piaget and others who continued his work have 
provided very little data to support these notions. This study has at­
tempted to fill that void. What Piaget did suggest was a system for 
identifying cooperative behaviors in groups which the present author, for
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the first time, has attempted to put in concrete terms in the form of six 
cooperativeness measures.
Piaget's presentation of evidence seems to be concentrated in the 
area of cognitive or intellectual development. The criticisms that he 
ignored the social or interpersonal aspects are true to the extent that 
he did not offer much concrete evidence for their presence. The same 
can be said of those who study only the social and interpersonal systems 
at the expense of cognitive processes. However, social and interpersonal 
systems are an integral part of Piaget's theorizing, particularly in 
the area of moral reasoning. The present investigation has attempted to 
bridge the gap between the study of cognitive processes and the study 
of interpersonal social systems by looking at how cognitive development 
of moral judgment relates to interpersonal process in the form of peer 
group interaction.
The evidence presented here suggests that Piaget's emphasis upon 
peer group cooperation as the forum for development of moral judgment 
has some merit and support. The scope of the present study was limited 
so that it could not support the degree of relationship that Piaget 
seems to imply nor could it answer some specific questions about how 
cooperativeness and moral judgment are related or how they interact and 
influence one another.
A few specific conclusions can be drawn, however. For example, 
the group behavior that seems to be the most potent (of the six measures 
used) as an index of how cooperatively the group interacts is the propor­
tion of individuals who offer opinions concerning some group task. In 
the high moral judgment groups, a "spirit" of cooperation seems to exist
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that enables each member to put forth at least one opinion and argue on its 
behalf. This group style is perhaps the most important characteristic of 
a democratic process in which all opinions are important and all must 
be debated before a concensus is reached.
The implication in this is that children who are cognitively func­
tioning at higher levels of moral reasoning as defined by Piaget, inter­
act more democratically in the interpersonal realm. It is probably also 
true that those who interact more democratically are functioning at 
higher levels of moral reasoning, but the present study was designed to 
reveal the former. Piaget wrote about how the democratic societies of 
older children provide a forum for development of moral judgment and that 
these societies were more important than adult sanctions that attempted 
to encourage moral development. The reverse was also true according to 
Piaget. The more mature moral judgment level was conducive to democratic 
interpersonal interactions.
Another finding consistent with Piaget's theory was the tendency 
for the interpersonal behavior (as measured by the proportion of time each 
individual talked in relation to the total time all individuals talked) 
of children scoring high on a test of moral judgment to be more stable, 
consistent, and established across groups. For the high groups, the vari­
ances in individuals' total talking time during the group interaction 
were moderately high, indicating that group members did not talk an equal 
amount of time, but that all members participated to some extent and this 
kind of participation was similar among the five high groups. For the 
low groups, the variances were very high or very low, indicating either 
that all group members talked equally much (low variance) or that one
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or two group members barely talked at all or said nothing (high vari­
ance).
This finding may be consistent with Piaget's notion that before 
children reach a mature level of moral reasoning, they go through inter­
mediate stages during which time their moral judgment is somewhat incon­
sistent, oscillating back and forth between mature thinking and immature 
thinking. If peer group cooperation is closely related to mature moral 
judgment, some inconsistency in peer group cooperation might be expected 
from children who are in the intermediate stages of moral judgment de­
velopment before mature moral judgment has emerged.
The above finding is one indication that the subjects used in the 
present study in the low moral judgment groups represented the intermediate 
stages of moral judgment as much as the lower stage. Another indication 
was mentioned previously--there were more high scorers (scores above 10) 
than low scorers among all of the children who took the Moral Judgment 
Test. A group of subjects perhaps a year or two younger may have been 
more appropriate.
A final conclusion of a more specific nature is that of all the six 
cooperativeness measures, the one that was the least potent in discrimi­
nating the high and low groups was the number of game rules that that the 
group as a whole invented. There was very little difference between high 
and low groups on how many rules they created. One possible explanation 
is that the democratic process (represented in the more cooperative groups 
or the high groups) is not conducive to maximum efficiency in the com­
pletion of a task within a short time period. Even though children in 
the high moral judgment groups should be able to create more complex and 
extensive rule systems because of their higher level of intellectual func­
tioning which underlies their moral judgment functioning, they do not
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because of a conflicting tendency in their democratic group process toward 
slow and painstaking compromise and airing of many diverse views.
The overall conclusion that seems to be outstanding is that Piaget's 
theory of moral judgment can be studied as an interaction between cogni­
tive development and social development. Specific behaviors that foster 
peer group cooperation can be identified and shown to be related to moral 
judgment level. The democratic process that Piaget thought was inherent 
in groups of older children can be shown to be more characteristic of 
groups of individuals who are the same age who function at the higher 
level of moral reasoning than of those v/ho function at a lower level. And 
the democratic peer group can be singled out as one forum for the verbal 
or symbolic expression of mature moral judgments and perhaps also as the 
forum for the development of these judgments as well.
APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A 
MORAL JUDGMENT TEST
1. Four boys went downtown one day and were looking in the store windows. 
One boy said, "Let's go into this store and see if we can take something." 
Two of the others thought this was a good idea but the other one didn't 
want to. The three that wanted to told the one that didn't want to that 
they'd tell all the other guys that he was chicken. So he went with them. 
They all took a few things but then the store detective caught up with 
them. He caught the one that had suggested it and he caught the two that 
had gone along with the idea. But he didn't notice the one who hadn't 
wanted to take anything, even though he was right beside the others and 
was acting the same as they were, so that this one didn't get caught at all
Do you think that this boy would have been caught too, if he had wanted 
to take things like the other three did?
Now why did this one get away when the other three were caught?
2. A girl named Nancy liked one of the boys in her class an awful lot, but 
she didn't want anyone to know it, even though she'd never been out with 
the boy or anything like that. She told her best girl friend about it and 
the girlfriend promised not to tell. But then she got angry at Nancy one 
day and told a lot of people, so that Nancy got teased a lot, but this 
boy hadn't gone with her before, so she had nothing to lose on that score.
Now here is a story something like the first one.
This girl was named Sharon. She was going steady with one boy, but her 
parents had visitors from out of town, who had a son her age. Her parents 
asked her to show this boy a litt.le of the town. She didn't like doing 
this because she thought it wasn't fair to her steady boy friend, but she 
went out with this boy to be polite. She told her best girl friend about 
this and the girl friend promised not to tell--just like in the first story 
Entirely by accident, this girl friend mentioned it in front of Sharon's 
steady boy friend and some other kids. He got angry at Sharon because 
she'd gone out with someone else when they were supposed to be going steady 
so he quit going out with her. Sharon got teased and lost her boy friend 
too because of what her girl friend had said without thinking.
Now was Nancy's girl friend or was Sharon's girl friend the worst? Why?
3. Some boys and girls were playing football in the street. A pass was 
thrown and the boy who ran to catch it ran uo onto a yard and trampled 
some recently planted shrubs and flowers. What should be done to the boy:
(1) make him pay for the damage done or replace the shrubs and flowers;
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(2) give him a licking so he won't do it again; (3) not allow him to play 
football. (Underline what should be done)
What punishment would be the fairest?
What punishment would be the hardest?
4. The stores downtown are always worried about shoplifting. In the past 
few years the stores have been good to high school students by giving them 
part-time work, especially at Christmas, to provide those who don't have 
much money with some buying power. The police have been working on the shop­
lifting problem, too, arresting many more people. Shoplifting has decreased 
recently.
What do you think is resnonsible for most of the decrease, the stores help­
ing the young people or the increased police arrests?
Why?
5. A group of young people were coming back to school after playing soft- 
ball. Some of them had nicked up rocks on the baseball diamond and were 
throwing them around. Finally, one boy threw a rock which broke a window 
in the school. The principal was nearby and heard the crash. He took them 
all into a room and asked them who broke the window. Some of them hadn't 
thrown any rocks at all, and of those who had thrown them only one broke 
the window. The boy who had broken the window wouldn't say that he had 
done it and the other boys would not tell on him.
Should the principal punish all of the boys or none of them?
Why?
6. A boy, about 16 years old, had a driver's license. His father said 
that he could use the car whenever he asked, as long as his parents weren't 
going to use it. The boy used it pretty often but one night his father told
him not to, because he and the boy's mother wanted to use it as soon as the
father got off work that evening. His mother was out so the boy figured 
that he'd use it anyway and get it back before either parent got home. He 
and a buddy of his took a ride around town but just as he was headed home,
he got a flat. Because of the time it took fixing the flat, the boy didn't
get the car home on time to beat his Dad, so that his Dad found out, and 
wouldn't let him use the car for a month.
Now, if he'd have been driving the car with his father's consent would he 
have still got the flat?
Why?
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7. There was a boy named Bill whose parents were going on vacation. He 
had a paper route and had to get someone to take it for him for a week so 
that he could go with them. He got his friend, a boy named Jimmy, to take 
the route and Jimmy did a good job for a couple of days. Then Jim's grand­
father got sick and his parents had to leave town to be with him and the 
boy had to go with his parents. He didn't want to go and leave Bill's 
route, but he had to. He had to leave with his folks in such a hurry that 
he didn't have time to get anyone else to take the route; he just notified 
the paper manager. Hell, when Bill got back from his vacation he had lost 
his paper route because Jimmy, the boy he'd gotten as a substitute, had to 
leave it, so they'd hired another boy.
Here is another story like the first one:
There was a boy named Johnny and he had a paper route too. His parents 
were going on vacation and he had to find someone, to take the route for him 
so he could go too. He got one of his friends, a boy named Paul, to take 
the route for a week. Paul got paid $5.00 in advance for the week so he 
didn't pay much attention to how he did the job. He forgot some places 
some of the days and didn't deliver at all to them. Some other customers 
got angry because he didn't roll the papers tight and parts of the paper 
blew away or sometimes got wet. When Johnny got back he found that he had 
lost one customer out of every five.
Now which one of the friends that took the paper route was worse, the first 
one or the other one?
Why?
8. This girl was sitting around the house on a day off from school. Her 
Dad asked her to go down to the grocery store to get some things because he 
and the mother didn't have a chance to go themselves. The girl said that 
she'd go in a few minutes and then she said she'd go after while. Anyway,
she never got around to going. No one else had been able to go, so they
had a pretty poor supper that night. The father was angry at her. He 
figured out a few different punishments for the girl. The first one he
thought of was of not letting her go out at all that week. The second one
he thought of was to whip her. The third punishment that he thought of 
was this: The girl had a bicycle that they'd bought her and often asked 
her Dad, who was an A-l mechanic, to do some work on it. The father figured 
that the next time the girl asked him, he'd do just like the girl; he'd 
never get around to helping her.
Which one was the fairest?
Which of the three punishments was the worst?
Which one was the one that you think the father gave her?
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9. Two guys about 10 years old, who lived in the same apartment house, got 
hold of some firecrackers last Fourth of July. Firecrackers are illegal, 
of course, but besides that, they both had fathers who worked nights. The 
firecrackers woke their fathers up and each father took his own boy into 
the house. The first father gave his boy a couple of pretty hard swats 
for waking him up. The second father took his son in and just told him how 
he'd been un all night and needed to sleeo, and that waking him up would 
be just the same sort of thing as if someone keot the boy awake at night 
after he wanted to go to sleep. So both boys went outside again and played 
more quietly. But there were still firecrackers left and the next day one 
of the boys set them off, waking up the two fathers again.
Which boy do you think it was this time?
Why?
10. There was a school dance and one small group was smoking in the school 
building, which was against rules. The grownups found out that this had 
happened, but they couldn't find out who had done it, because no one would 
tell. Since they couldn't find out who the individuals were, the principal 
decided to discontinue the dances for the whole school for the rest of the 
semester.
Was this right?
Why?
11. Two fellows were out one night and wanted to go riding in a car. They 
didn't have one, but they saw a car that was parked in front of a house with 
the keys in it, so they took that car. They drove it around for awhile but 
then they spotted a Dolice car so they stopped the car and got out and start­
ed to run through backyards and alleys to ditch the police. They ran for 
awhile but then one of them got winded and police caught up with him. The 
other one ran for awhile more and then he acrossed a ravine by an old 
bridge. The bridge was rotten and a plank broke on him so that one leg 
went through and got broken. Now what do you think?
If this boy had not stolen the car and had been running across the ravine 
on the old, rotten bridge all the same, would he have still broken through 
and hurt himself?
Why?
12. This story is about a guy who came from a tough neighborhood. He did 
pretty well, generally, but he sometimes took things. He had a friend who 
was a very good basketball player but whose folks didn't have much money so
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that his buddy couldn't afford to get gym shoes. One day when this boy 
was downtown he went into a store and took some gym shoes that they had 
there and gave them to his friend. Then a couple of weeks later he was 
hanging around the drug store and managed to take a big box of chocolates 
that only cost about one quarter as much as the gym shoes. He didn't tell 
anyone about them; just keot them hidden and ate them. Now he wasn't 
caught either time and no one ever found out where his friend got the gym 
shoes.
Now which time was the stealing worse?
Why?
13. A boy was out with a group of friends one evening. They got to wrest­
ling and one boy began wrestling each of the others, even when they didn't 
want to. He got to wrestling with a boy who was wearing glasses and the 
glasses fell off and broke. Now there were all sorts of things that the 
grownups could do to him: (1) they could give him a speanking or (2) they 
could have him work to pay for replacing the glasses or (3) they could 
break something of his.
What would be the worst punishment?
What would be the fairest punishment?
Which one do you think that they gave him?
14. A girl wanted to use her mother's fur coat but the mother didn't want 
her to and told her not to use it because she was afraid the girl would 
maybe lose it in some way. The girl used it anyway figuring she wouldn't 
get caught, but the mother caught her. When she caught her using the coat 
she was so angry she made the girl stay in at night for a week.
There was another girl who wanted to use her mother's coat too, even though 
her mother didn't want her to and told her not to use it. The girl did 
use it anyway and the mother caught her at it but what this mother did was 
talk to the girl, explaining why she didn't want her to use it so that the 
girl would understand.
Now one girl used her mother's fur coat the next time she thought the mother 
was not around and the other one didn't use it again.
From these stories, tell me which one you think used the coat and which one 
didn't.
Why?
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15. A science class was on a trip in the spring and they stopped to look 
over an apple orchard that was in bloom. While the leader wasn't around, 
one oerson in the groun cut off many limbs, to get apple blossoms. He did 
this when none of the others were looking, so that none of the group knew 
who did it. The farmer saw the cut branches in the cars and was very angry. 
He complained to the nroun leader but no one knew who did it so no one 
could tell the group leader who had done it. The farmer and the grouo 
leader decided to charge everyone in the group equally to pay the damages, 
since they couldn't find out who had done it.
Was this right?
Why?
16. A girl named Mary didn't like another girl because this girl was going 
with a boy Mary liked. Mary called up this girl's mother and told her a lot 
of lies about the boy, so that the mother wouldn't let her daughter go out 
with him. Because of this Mary got to go out with him. The first time 
that they went out, another car hit the one they were in and Mary got a 
broken nose.
Now if she'd have not told any lies, but had gotten to go out that same 
night with this boy she liked anyway, would she still have gotten a broken 
nose?
Why?
17. There was a young fellow named George who was working in a filling sta­
tion. He was cutting gas in a car and the driver asked him to check the 
oil. Then the driver went inside. George got done putting in gas and was 
just about to check the oil when another car came in that wanted service 
in a hurry. He went to wait on this car and then had to help another car.
He forgot all about checking the oil in the car he had started out with.
The driver paid him but didn't ask about the oil because he figured George 
would have added some if it was needed. It haopened that the oil was very 
low when Georoe forgot tc check it and soon there wasn't any oil left, so 
that the motor was damaged fairly much.
Here is another story like the first one.
This young man's name was Dale and he worked as a station attendant, too.
He was putting gas in a car when the driver asked him to check the oil.
The driver went inside and then Dale got to talking to some of his friends 
who'd come in to see him. He figured that probably the car didn't need 
any oil anyway. When the driver came out he asked Dale how the oil was and 
Dale said that it was all right, even though he knew he hadn't checked it.
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The oil was low on this car, too, but the owner had it checked again before 
it ran completely out of oil, so that not too much happened to hurt this 
car.
Now which station attendant was worse?
Why?
18. This groun of boys went into a candy store every day after school.
When they started out, everything was all right, but soon they began to take 
candy and things. One day the owner cauoht them. They admitted that they'd 
been taking things for quite awhile. The owner didn't know whether (1) to 
call the juvenile squad of the police or (2) to give the boys a spanking or
(3) to have the boys do things like sweeping and mopping the store till they'd 
worked to pay for what they had taken.
What punishment would be the fairest?
What punishment would be the hardest?
What did the storekeeper do?
19. Two boys qot caught stealing a car. Their homes, their school records, 
etc., were exactly alike, and neither had led the other into taking the 
car, but for some reason one was sent to Redwing Training School and the 
other was put on probation and was allowed to stay at home. The one who 
stayed at home had a good probation officer who worked with him a lot. The 
one who was sent to Redwing was given lots of discipline till he was re­
leased after about a year and came home. Now they were both in their 
neighborhood aoain. About six months later one of them stole another car.
Which one do you think it was?
Why?
20. Some girls borrowed a car one night from the cider brother of one of 
them. They went for a ride in the country and, since they all had driver's 
licenses, they took turns driving. They all drove carefully but one was 
driving a little fast and skidded on the ice. The car went into the ditch 
and got a banged up grille and right fender.
Now was the one driving responsible for the accident or should they all be 
held responsible?
Why?
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Scoring Criteria for the Moral Judgment Test
Questions 1, 6, 11, and 16, deal with immanent justice. The mature 
response would be one which brought in the idea of chance--that chance 
caused one boy to escape while the others were caught. The immature response 
would be the one that attributed some sort of supernatural cause to these 
events.
Questions 2, 7, 12, and 17, all have to do with moral realism. The 
mature response would be one in which acts were judged in terms of intent; 
the immature response would judge an act according to its consequences.
The problem of choosing between punishment in terms of expiation or 
retribution as opposed to punishment in terms of restitution appears in 
questions 3, 8, 13, and 18. The mature response would be the restitutive 
one, chosen because it was fairest, not because it was hardest. (Sometimes 
the restitutive punishment might be chosen, not because it was the fairest, 
but solely because it was considered to be the most severe. In this case 
the resoonse would be considered an immature one.) The choice of an ex­
piatory punishment would be scored as an immature resoonse.
Questions 4, 9, 14 and 19 had to do with the efficacy of severe 
punishment. Answers in which the position was taken that the less severe 
punishment was more effective were scored as mature, while those responses 
that indicated a belief in the efficacy of the more severe punishment were 
scored as immature.
Communicable responsibility was dealt with in questions 5, 10, 15, 
and 20. In each case, those resnonses that rejected communicable respon­
sibility were judged to be mature, while those that accepted the idea of 
communicable responsibility were considered to be immature. (Johnson, 1962)
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For all questions, a score of either mature or immature was given. 
A "1" was assigned to mature scores and a "0" to immature scores. The 
numerical score on any one moral judgment test reflected the number of 
questions that the subject taking the test had answered in the mature
fashion.
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APPENDIX B
March 8, 1976
Dear Parents:
The purpose of this letter is to inform you of two studies which will 
draw subjects from the 8th grade class. The first is concerned with the 
development of children's thinking, the second with the development of 
certain group behaviors. We may be asking your child to participate in 
one or both of these studies. They are part of a research project con­
ducted by Robbie Schwab-Steohens of the University of North Dakota in 
order to complete the dissertation for her doctoral degree.
In one study, Mrs. Schwab-Stephens will be interested in how children 
think about certain dilemmas that involve concepts of justice, fairness, 
punishment, responsibility and correctness. The students will read a 
series of stories and answer questions about them. The other study will 
require students to create games from a variety cf materials. We will 
not be concerned with any specific child's performance in either experi­
ment, only with crouo trends, and neither study is concerned at all with 
intellectual abilities.
If you have any questions concerning the studies or your child's partici­
pation, please feel free to call me, Robbie Schwab-Stephens at 775-7383.
I will be beginning the research at Sacred Heart Grade School the third 
week of March, so I would appreciate the return of the consent form below 
by Thursday, March 11. Results of the studies will be given to Sister 
Mary Jean in June if you wish to see them.
Yes, I would like my child to participate in the studies described 
above.
No, I do not want my child to participate.
Thank you,
Parent's Signature
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